The international membership of the Society for Research in Adult Development (SRAD) includes people from all disciplines who are interested in positive adult development. Positive adult development concerns itself with development starting in late adolescence and continuing throughout life. The focus is on the changes and expanded capabilities that improve the quality of life of individuals as they adapt to the challenges of adulthood's ages and stages.

For practitioners, the Society offers an opportunity to discover the latest ideas in the field and to explore the application of those ideas to everyday problems and challenges. For academic researchers and theoreticians, the Society offers the opportunity to share ideas, often in a deeper way, with other researchers and theoreticians through discussion and the exchange of papers. Researchers and theoreticians are able to explore the application of their ideas to the problems and opportunities of daily life by working on them with practitioners from many fields.

The Society supports diversity within its membership. Such diversity includes differences in professional status, academic discipline, occupation, race, culture, gender, and sexual orientation. We extend an invitation to all those interested in this field to join us whether their context is adult development in the individual or whether it's development within the framework of families, work, school, or communities.

For more information, including the Society's history, visit its website, http://adultdevelopment.org.

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### ARTICLES

by James Meredith Day

**Moral Motivation and Its Developmental Complexity.**
by Ulas Kaplan

**The Effects of Assessment Task Format on Moral Reasoning.**
by Val D. Turner

### UPCOMING

**22ND ANNUAL ADULT DEVELOPMENT SYMPOSIUM OF THE SOCIETY FOR RESEARCH IN ADULT DEVELOPMENT**

At John B. Hynes Veterans Memorial Convention Center
Boston, Massachusetts
March 28 - 29, 2007

The 2007 annual Symposium of the Society for Research in Adult Development will be held Wednesday through mid-Thursday, March 28 and 29, 2007 as a pre-conference meeting of the Society for Research on Child Development. Each year, researchers, practitioners, and students of adult development meet at the SRAD symposium to explore diverse topics from an interdisciplinary perspective. The program encompasses the entire field of positive adult development. It is characterized by symposium-style discussions in each topic’s session.

Typically, participants present posters to facilitate discussion of data, theories, and applications. Many traditions and points-of-view are represented. Among the subjects addressed are life periods, seasons, stages, and levels; whole-life approaches; consciousness; clinical development; adult attachment; careers; and expertise, wisdom, conflict resolution, life span, and others.
NEW PUBLICATION REPORT
SYMPOSIA PROCEEDINGS

Beginning with the 2007 Symposium, the Society will web-publish selected proceedings from its Annual Adult Development Symposia under the planned title of *Adult Development*. Selections will be drawn from Symposia authors’ submissions to *Adult Development* by an editorial board. Selected papers will be those that move the field forward. See the **Call for Papers** on page 4 of this Bulletin.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
By Michael Lamport Commons

The Society for Research in Adult Development has been having good, healthy growth the last four years. The quality of papers is dramatically improving. The scoring workshop we do during the Symposium is generally well attended. Lately, people have actually designed instruments, and a number of people have begun to use what they learned in the workshop to score interview data. The SRAD workshops are open to anyone, and they are free. When we offer them elsewhere, they cost upwards of $90 to attend.

The Society is really becoming professionalized, developing as an organization in its depth with a highly developed website and a large set of positions filled. Some still need to be filled. We never had this much organization. The last two years have really been a breakthrough in this regard.

I think our major task at this point is to get the *Journal of Adult Development* functioning. We need to either help Jack Demick, the editor, do this, or get Springer to think through what they want to do. Not having a Journal has interfered with the Society's progress. We are considering posting lots of papers on the website. We would need to put together an editorial board to make selections and edit them. If the *Journal of Adult Development* goes on too long with nothing changing, we will have to have a web-based journal.

We should consider our relationship with Gerontology, and somehow identify ourselves with that field. Positive Adult Development has had good relations with Positive Psychology and not at all with Gerontology. Usually, new fields have to differentiate themselves. We may have done that, now. We may be able to interact with Gerontology now. We might be able to have interactions where we do not get swallowed up by them, and they do not dismiss Positive Adult Development.

UP TO CONTENTS

THEN AND NOW: GOOGLING THE FIELD

In the Spring 2001 issue of *Adult Developments*, then-editor Bernie Folta wrote:

Just for the heck of it, I searched for "adult development" on the Google search engine on the Internet....The search for "adult development" returned 35,500 "hits." I didn't look at all of them (naturally), but many of the dozens I did look at emphasized adult development and aging. A number of colleges and universities had course materials on the Web for their courses in adult development, and it was interesting to see how different teachers emphasize different aspects of the field. When I searched Google for "positive adult development," there were 35 "hits," many of them referring to SRAD.

As this Spring 2007 issue of *Adult Developments* was going to press, we re-ran Bernie's test. A google of “adult development” returned 737,000 hits and “positive adult development” returned 215 hits. SRAD’s website was listed first in both lists of search results.

SESSION TOPICS OF THE 2007 SRAD SYMPOSIUM
(CLICK HERE FOR WEBSITE’S PROGRAM WITH ABSTRACTS, ORGANIZED BY SESSION)

**WEDNESDAY, MARCH 28**
Supporting and Measuring Adult Development in the Classroom & Beyond
Moral & Ethical Development: Theory & Measurement
Clinical Perspectives & Psycho-Social Development
Parenting, Relationships & Family Processes

*Workshop*: Applying a Positive Adult Developmental Approach to Research, Assessment, and Intervention in Individual and Organizational Development

**THURSDAY, MARCH 29**
Health & Mental Acuity in Adulthood
Leadership, Community, Conflict Resolution, & Organizational Development
Lunch outing and Membership Business Meeting

**PRESENTERS AND TITLES IN THE 2007 SRAD SYMPOSIUM**

Comparison of the Steps for Better Thinking and Model of Hierarchical Complexity models for understanding cognitive development in young adults. Ellen C. Banks (Daemen College), Samantha Sessamen (Daemen College) & Alissa D’Attilio (Daemen College)

Extending a Constructivist Developmental Pedagogical Model to Incorporate Jung’s Psychological Types. John E. Barbuto, Jr. (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)

HOT Research: Higher Order Thinking Using Computer-Based Instruction. Darlene Crone-Todd (Salem State College)
Perceived and Measured Impact of Short-term Study Abroad: A Mixed Method Exploratory Study. Shana M. Dangelo (Suffolk University) & Alice LoCicero (Suffolk University)

Experiential Learning as a Context for Positive Adult Development. Joanna Gonsalves (Salem State College) Eric Metchik (Salem State College) & Alson Claussnitzer (Salem State College)

The role of experience in acquiring generalizable knowledge. Ji Y. Son (Indiana University) & Robert L. Goldstone (Indiana University)

Template for Developing a Customized Critical Thinking Rubric. Susan Wolcott (WolcottLynch Associates)

Stereotypes about the Elderly: The Impressions of College Students enrolled in Introductory Psychology Courses. Pamelyn M. MacDonald (Washburn University)

Is it roughly correct to say that there are four kinds of development? Michael Lamport Commons (Harvard Medical School)

The dynamic nature of moral motivation and emotional experience in moral meaning making. Ulas Kaplan (Harvard Graduate School of Education)

Stage of Development in Understanding Christ’s Moral Sayings. Carrie Melissa Ost, Michael Lamport Commons (Harvard Medical School), Maria da Costas Lins (Universidade Federal Rio de Janeiro Brasil), James Meredith Day (Université Catholique de Louvain), Sara Nora Ross (ARINA, Inc.), & Joan Crist (Calumet College)

A Comparison of Moral Reasoning Using Items from a Number of Instruments Using the Model of Hierarchical Complexity and Rasch Analysis. Terri Lee Robinett (College of the Desert)

Is there "religious reasoning"? Problems and Prospects from Empirical Research on Stage, Structure, and Style in models of Moral Judgment and Religious Judgment Development. James Meredith Day (Université Catholique de Louvain)

Moral Development in an Undergraduate Business Ethics Course: A Research Study Utilizing Deliberate Psychological Education. Christopher D. Schmidt (The College of William and Mary) & Christopher P. Adkins (The College of William and Mary)

A Rasch Analysis and Factor Analysis of Generativity and Self-Transcendence Items. Jose Ferreira Alves (University of Minho), Ean Stuart Bett (Harvard Extension School), Michael Lamport Commons (Harvard Medical School), Michael Levenson (Oregon State University), Margarida Pedroso Lima (University of Coimbra) & Pedro Lopes dos Santos (University of Oporto)

Acts Against Judgment: Growth from Self-Betrayal. Paul Nelson (University of West Georgia) & Jim Dillon (University of West Georgia)

Profiles of Benefit Finding Among Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis Patients and their Primary Caregivers. Steven E. Mock (Yale School of Management)

Quality of Work Life of Young Adults with Personality Disorders. Peter J. Antinoro (Arizona Western College)

The Role of Basic and Self-Conscious Emotions on Four Features of Autobiographical Memory and Clarity of Self-Concept. Dina Tell (Loyola University) & Denise Davidson (Loyola University)

Diversity in the Transition to Adulthood. Ingrid Schoon (City University, London)

What have we learned about the psychological processes in adults from stage? Michael Lamport Commons (Harvard Medical School)

Mothers’ reflections on daughters’ relational aggression: Intersections of identity issues and experience. Dawn E. Schrader (Cornell University) & Jess Matthews Duval (Cornell University)

The Interplay of Intuition and Cognition in Moral Reasoning: Exploring Mothers’ Perspectives of their Daughters’ Relational Aggression Experiences. Christine Gouveia (Cornell University), Dawn E. Schrader (Cornell University), & Jess Matthews Duval (Cornell University)

Cultural Differences and Similarities in Correlates of Parenting Effectiveness: A Comparison of East Asian and White-European Mothers of College Students. Esther S. Chang (University of California, Irvine), Ellen Greenberger (University of California, Irvine) & Chuansheng Chen (University of California, Irvine)

Family process mediators of the relation between components of SES and child outcomes. Robert Flynn Corwyn (University of Arkansas at Little Rock), Belinda Blevins-Knabe, (University of Arkansas at Little Rock) & Robert H. Bradley (University of Arkansas at Little Rock)

Informal Caregiving Stages—Do They Exist? Laura Donorffio (University of Connecticut)

Developmental Changes in Korean Juvenile Offenders’ Parents. Lee Hee-Jung (Baekseok University)

Psychosocial Development in Middle Adulthood: Social Support and Stress for Parents of Adolescents. Elise N. Pepin (Utica College)

Dyadic Processes and Child Outcomes: Multitrait-Multimethod Analyses of Mexican-American Father’s, Mother’s, Adolescent’s, and Observer’s Ratings of Parenting. Marie A. Miller (University of California, Riverside)

Predicting the stability of romantic relationships. M. Minda Orita (University of Minnesota), W. Andrew Collins (University of Minnesota), Jeffry A. Simpson (University of Minnesota), Katherine C. Haydon (University of Minnesota), John S. Kim (University of Minnesota) & Jessica Salvatore (University of Minnesota)
Relationships, Attachment and School Completion. Thomas G. Reio, Jr. (University of Louisville), Joanne Sanders-Reio (University of Louisville) & Robert F. Marcus (University of Maryland, College Park)

Workshop: Applying a Positive Adult Developmental Approach to Research, Assessment, and Intervention in Individual and Organizational Development. Michael Lamport Commons (Harvard Medical School), Alice LoCicero (Suffolk University), Patrice Marie Miller (Salem State College), Joseph Anthony Rodriguez (Massachusetts Mental Health Center) & Sara Nora Ross (ARINA, Inc.)

Social relations and health across nations and cultures. Besangie Sellars (University of Michigan), Toni C. Antonucci (University of Michigan) & Kira Birditt (University of Michigan)

What’s Black and White and Read All Over? Assessing the Mental Acuity of Elderly Persons Using the Stroop Test. Douglas E. Sperry (Indiana State University), Emma E. Sperry (Honey Creek Middle School) & Linda L. Sperry (Indiana State University)

Autobiographical Recall Via Culturally Biased Cue Words: Variations In Affect, Intensity and Salience. Mattie S. Gabston (UC Davis)

Personality and Positive Affect in Older Men and Women. Dorothea Bye (Concordia University) & Dolores Pushkar (Concordia University)

Effects of a Structured Public Issues Discourse Method on the Complexity of Citizens’ Reasoning and Local Political Development. Sara Nora Ross (ARINA, Inc.)

The Requisite Organization Model of Human Capability. Glenn Mehltretter (PeopleFit), Herb Koplowitz (Terra Firma Management Consulting) & Michelle Malay Carter (PeopleFit)

The Requisite Organization Model of Complexity of Work. Herb Koplowitz (Terra Firma Management Consulting), Glenn Mehltretter (PeopleFit) & Michelle Malay Carter (PeopleFit)

Talk, Terror, and Torture: Developmental Perspectives on Impossible Global Choices. Alice LoCicero (Suffolk University)

Renegotiating the "expert" role: Developmental change in teachers, administrators and consultants. Michelle Ronayne (Suffolk University), Manila Austin (Suffolk University), Beth Doppler (Suffolk University) & Debra Harkins (Suffolk University)


Putting Some Steak with the Sizzle: Research Opportunities in Servant Leadership. John E. Barbuto, Jr. (University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
continue after a 2nd notice has been sent, a MARC member will personally contact the non-renewing member with an exploratory (non-judgmental!) inquiry. The reasons for non-renewal, without names of their sources, are collected to help SRAD’s self-evaluation process.

Attraction & Retention of Members. MARC devises a new procedure to announce/introduce new members to the membership via the newsletter and/or listserve (fostering a sense of being a group...). New members throughout the year are assigned to various MARC members to be in occasional contact with them. This could take forms such as: (a) email them a welcoming note and inquire into their interests, and report to the board what their interests are (and start accumulating such data routinely when we are more automated); (b) if they attend the symposium, introduce them to others, share a meal and conversation, etc.; (c) find out if they have joined the list serve; if not, encourage them to consider it; (d) forward them items of interest via email during the year.

SRAD members at large are encouraged to invite others to join the listserve and/or Society, read the newsletter/bulletin, review the Annual Symposium Program’s abstracts, and contact symposium presenters whose work is of interest to them. If you would like to help grow the Society and contribute novel and/or time-tested ideas, please email admin@adultdevelopment.org.

2. Society positions to fill

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<th>Position</th>
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<td>* Meeting Coordinator . . . . .</td>
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<td>Public Relations Policy . . .</td>
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<td>Gwen Sorell</td>
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<td>Ellen Banks</td>
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<td>Symposia Proceedings . . . .</td>
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<td>Sara Ross</td>
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* Role descriptions:
Meeting coordinator: Handle meeting room reservation; make sure people-tasks are done and everything is ready.
Meeting notes secretary: Take notes and type them up.
Financial reporting: Use information supplied by others to make simple revenue and expense annual report.
Listserves moderator: maintain main yahoo group (e.g., clear old addresses) and make group list for symposium presenters each year.

NOTES FROM THE 2006 SRAD BUSINESS MEETING: SAN FRANCISCO, APRIL 5, 2006

By Michael Lamport Commons, based on notes by Katy Jay

Members Present: Michael Lamport Commons, James Day, Ellen Banks, Carrie Bassett, Alice LoCicero, Dorothea Bye, Kathleen Ronsyn, Peter Hayward, Saba Ayman-Nolley, Shane Smith, Gregorio Convertino, Katy Jay.

Agenda:

Michael Commons' Introductory remarks: The 2006 symposium smallest group yet the best. Cumulatively, the organization is very active with a list serve of 150 members. The health of the organization is good, although there were some presenters who cancelled after having presentations accepted for the 2006 meeting.

Other topics:
1. The editorial board usually heavily international; it is important to have more international members.
2. Organization: Division of tasks: Alice LoCicero-Public Relations/Policy Maker; Joanna Gonzalez-Website; Michael Commons-newsletter; Gwen Sorell-Membership; Sara Ross-Organizational Infrastructure. The website will list these roles and will be updated as changes take place.
3. Web site: The new website works with PayPal. We will have on line registration for the 2007 symposium.
4. Mission: Members need to be successful researchers and promoters of positive adult development. SRAD is devoted to helping students and teachers to do good research and to get quality academic positions.
5. James Day suggested a publication that publishes material presented at symposia.
6. The next meeting will be a pre-meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development in SRCD in Boston (Spring 2007).

SRAD MEMBERSHIP, REGISTRATION, AND DUES NEWS

Among the benefits of membership in SRAD are:
- you become part of a network of people interested in and working in the field of positive adult development.
- you receive the newsletter of the Society, Adult Developments–The SRAD Bulletin.
- you receive the Call for Papers for SRAD's annual symposia and other communiqués.
- you are eligible to submit work presented in annual symposia for inclusion in the selected proceedings published in Adult Development.

SRAD's membership year is from the beginning of one
annual symposium to the beginning of the one the following year. The symposium registration fee includes SRAD membership so that symposium attendees are automatically members for the year following the symposium they attend.

The combined form for both SRAD membership (only) and for membership plus symposium registration is at http://adultdevelopment.org/Mail_in%20registration%20form.txt.

Sometimes SRAD people lose track of whether their membership is current—whether they have paid their dues for the current year. To check your dues status, please contact Gwen Sorell at gwen.sorell@ttu.edu.

SRAD’S LISTSERVE

SRAD has an open listserve, and you are invited to join. Visit http://groups.yahoo.com and subscribe to the list adultdevel.

NEW BOOKS? NEW ACCOMPLISHMENTS?

SRAD Members are invited to submit information about their forthcoming books and other accomplishments for future issues of Adult Developments. Send them to Ellen Banks at ebanks@daemen.edu.

ARTICLES


James Meredith Day

Human Development Laboratory & Psychology of Religion Research Center, Universite catholique de Louvain, james.day@uclouvain.be

Abstract: From its inception psychological science has evidenced an interest in religious experience and the question whether there exists a distinct domain of development to which the category “religious” could be properly attributed. For 40 years related work, inspired by Piagetian models of psychological development, has proposed definitions of religious development, and explored links between religious development and other domains of psychological growth. The most central literature in this domain has insisted on close relationships between moral development and religious development, and has worked from the hypothesis cum assumption that moral development “drives” religious development; that upwards movement in moral reasoning should trigger or at least provide fertile ground for upwards movement in religious development. That said, empirical evidence has not substantiated such a picture of relationships between moral development and religious development. This article considers the dominant paradigms, some problems in the research literature, and offers some prospects for improved theory-making, and empirical research.

Religious Development and Psychological Science

Since its inception psychological science has evidenced an interest in religious experience, and its relationship to other domains of human behaviour. Early on, both psychoanalytical writers and experimentalists argued not only about the nature of religious experience and its relationship to other domains of human conduct, but also about the relative merits, or impact, of such experience on individual, group, and social welfare (see Wulff, 1998, for an excellent review). Work continues in psychology of religion today, with exponential growth in numbers of members in related scientific societies (e.g. APA, the International Association for the Psychology of Religion), and scientific publications, with excellent and highly selective peer-reviewed journals (International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, Archiv für Religionspsychologie, Journal of Religion and Mental Health, and others) providing a forum for some of the work.

One of the questions about which there has been debate, and research, is the question whether there might exist something that in psychological terms could be regarded as religious development. Jean Piaget, charged with the teaching of religion as well as biological science at an early stage of his career, wondered about this matter, and observed the seeming paradox between the schools’ insistence on the development of reasoning and conceptual ability in mathematics, laboratory science, and humanities, contrasted with the sometimes marked lack of receptivity to, and interest in developing, critical thinking in courses on religion.

For about forty years, psychologists have appropriated Piagetian paradigms in studying the question of religious development. Goldman (1964) offered an important contribution in examining whether conceptual abilities and stage structures characteristic of reasoning in domains other than religious ones (mathematics, for example, and classical Piagetian experiments having to do with weight, volume, etc), would apply in the description and interpretation of religious images. He found no difference between the logic employed by elementary and secondary school pupils in the Piagetian experiments and the description and interpretation of religious images. On the whole, this work was supported by the findings of other researchers who replicated, with some variation, the basic, transversal, methods and conceptual models in Goldman’s research, with larger, even cross-cultural, samples, and in a variety of educational settings, with good predictive as well as stable interpretative results (Degelman, Mullen & Mullen, 1984; Elkind, 1964; Hyde, 1990; Peatling & Laabs 1975; Tamminen & Nurmi 1995).

Other researchers, varying the research models and
concentrating their efforts on larger samples within a given age group, have worried that the stream of research marked by Goldmann’s efforts, did not pay sufficient attention to the variable of frequency and intensity of exposure to religious content amongst subjects, and the relative richness of description, and sophistication of interpretation, of subjects on religious images, stories, and questions. Thus, Hoge & Pettrillo (1978) showed that the richness and complexity displayed were at least in part a function of the familiarity subjects had with religious concepts and themes, as a function of their education in Protestant and Catholic schools, in contrast with students from non-church-related schools. Batson, Schoenrade & Ventis (1993) showed something similar, but argued that the concept of “performance gap” could help explain such differences. At least ten groups of researchers have demonstrated what they have called a “liberal bias” in the stage interpretations offered by Goldman, with pupils from families with more “liberal” political affiliations and attitudes doing better (i.e., scoring higher) on Goldman’s interpretative scales. Pierce & Cox (1995), in a meta-analytic study of research investigating the predictive power of Piagetian stage on interpretation of religious content, found no relation between the two, arguing that there were distinctive features of experience related to religious content that made for a considerable variety of logical postures regarding its interpretation.

**Religious Development and Moral Development**

The most thorough recent reviews of the literature (Day & Youngman, 2003; Streib, 1997; Tamminen & Nurmi, 1995; Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 2003; Vandenplas, 2001; Wulf 1997) demonstrate that the dominant models in religious development are those of Fowler, and of Oser & Gmunder, and Oser’s colleague at Fribour; Reich. Their work has focused on efforts to describe a developmental trajectory specific to religious development; in Fowler’s case, a model of what he calls “faith development,” and in Oser’s case “religious judgment development.” Reich has endeavored to understand the relationships that might be ascertained across domains of critical thinking, cognitive development, and the sphere of religious constructs. All have based their schemes of religious development on Kohlberg’s model of moral judgment development, and employed variants of Piaget’s, and later, Kohlberg’s uses of hypothetical dilemmas in clinical interview formats, in order to invite subjects to produce “resolutions” that are then interpreted in terms of a framework of supposedly universal, and hierarchical, stages (Fowler, 1981, 1996; Oser, Scarlett, & Buchner 2006; Oser & Gmunder 1991; Oser & Reich, 1996).

Fowler, and critical appraisers of his work (see Fowler, 1981, 1987, 1996; Day, 2001; Day & Youngman 2003; Tamminen & Nurmi, 1995) have observed that his is a multi-factorial model, given that its construct of “faith” is sufficiently broad to include dimensions associated with Piaget’s notions of intellectual development, Kohlberg’s model of moral development, Erikson’s stage model of identity construction, Loewenger’s and Levinson’s concepts of ego development, Selman’s model of role-taking and its development, and Kegan’s concepts of self in development.

Oser’s work, and that of his immediate colleagues and collaborators, formulates a more narrow, and precise, sense of religious development as “religious judgment development”, in which people’s formulations of the relationship between the person and the Ultimate Being are charted on a stage-scheme which like Fowler’s, and the models incorporated into Fowler’s own, move from states of relative simplicity, ego-centrism, and cognitive dualism, toward more differentiated, elaborated, and complex appreciations of self, relationship, context, perspective-taking, and person-God interaction. Oser and his colleagues use Piagetian terms in arguing there is a universal deep structure of religious cognition.

The literature in psychology of religion is replete with debates as to whether Fowler’s and Oser’s stages constitute “hard stages” in the Piagetian sense, or more flexible, malleable, and interpenetrating “soft stages”, as Power (1991) aptly argued, at least with regard to Fowler’s model. Oser and colleagues (Oser & Gmunder 1991; Kamminger & Rollett, 1996; Oser & Reich, 1996) have argued for the soundness of their stages as meeting the criteria of “hard stages” (see also Vandenplas-Holper, 2003).

Both the schemes of faith development, with six distinct stages, and religious judgment development, with five stages, assume a close, even intimate relationship, between moral development, in the Kohlbergian sense, and religious development. Fowler, Oser, et. al., argue that since religious reasoning includes components of moral reasoning, structural transformation sufficient to qualify as stage transition in moral reasoning will make it likely that related change in religious development will follow; moral development in some sense then “drives” religious development, and, since all people, whether religious, and however religious, must wrangle with and parse through moral dilemmas, confronted, as they are, throughout life, with moral questions, moral judgment development is thought to “precede” religious development.

Both “faith development” and “religious judgment development” theories have led to systematic reflection on the relationships amongst structure, content, context, and belonging as they relate to human development and religious belief, practice, and the very notion of religious development, with implications for research and practice in psychological science, theology, religious education, clinical and pastoral practice. Their assumptions about the relationship between religious development, and moral development, though, have not been supported in empirical research, pointing to potential problems in the stage conceptions proposed in both models.

Research conducted by Oser and his colleagues (for critical reviews see Day, 2001, 2006a, 2006b, 2007, in press; Day & Naedts, 1999; Day & Youngman 2003;
Tamminen & Nurmi (1995; Wulff, 1997) at first relied on clinical interviews, with transversal samples, conducted by them alone, and have only more recently been complemented by longitudinal studies (e.g. DiLoreto & Oser, 1996), minor refinements in method and larger numbers of subjects (Kamminge & Rollett, 1996), and related empirical instruments (e.g. The Religious Reflection Questionnaire (Day & Naedts, 1999) which provide valid and reliable measures of religious judgment and permit more rigorous testing of relationships between religious judgment and moral judgment (Day, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2007; Day & Naedts 1999; Day & Youngman 2003; Gibbs, Basinger, Grimes, & Snarey, 2007).

This research, despite larger numbers of subjects, longitudinal testing within Oser’s method based on his own clinical interviews, and large-scale (more than 2000 adolescents and adults), cross-cultural (Belgium, Costa Rica, England, Germany), rigorously empirical testing with valid and reliable measures of both religious judgment and moral judgment, has not supported the case made by Fowler and Oser as to the precedence of moral judgment over religious judgment. Indeed it has shown that, in some cases, moral judgment precedes religious judgment, and that some subjects have higher moral judgment scores than they do religious judgment or faith development scores, but that other subjects show opposite patterns of more elevated levels of religious judgment or faith development than moral judgment levels. On the whole, there is overwhelming evidence for the equivalence of moral judgment and religious judgment/fair development; the vast majority of subjects show no difference in levels between the two, and mean scores across thousands of subjects show a picture of evenness between them. Indeed, we have argued that the scores are so close as to call into question the notion that religious judgment exists, at least in Oser’s sense of it, as something distinct in structure, and content, from moral judgment. It may be that religious judgment is taught but moral judgment “dressed up” in religious garb; a kind of elaboration, in religious language, of structural features properly “belonging” to moral reasoning.

Prospects for Further Research

Researchers in cognitive science, developmental psychology, psychology of religion, pastoral psychology, theology, and mathematics have demonstrated an interest in questions pertaining to the fine-tuning, or modification of Piagetian and Kohlbergian conceptions of stage, structure, and sequence in moral development (which, as we have seen, is intimately related to religious development in the reigning models of it) and/or religious development. In some cases, alternative models have been proposed (see Day, 2003; Day & Naedts 1997; Day & Tappan, 1996; Day & Youngman 2003; Ganzvoort, 1998, 2006; Gergen 1994; Streib, 1991, 1997, Streib, Keller, & Csoff, 2007; Tappan, 1989, 1992; Wertsch, 1991; Youngman 1993), or the suggestion made that “development” is not a useful term for describing structural transformation in reasoning about religious issues in adolescence and adulthood (Duriez & Soenens, 2006; Hutsebaut 1995, 1996, 1997a, 1997b). Other researchers, most notably Commons and colleagues (e.g. Commons & Richards 1984; Commons, Richards & Kuhn, 1982; Commons, Trudeau, Stein, Richards & Krause, 1998; Commons, 2003) have argued that the problem of Piagetian stage formulation is not stage itself, but the need for more rigorous definitions and criteria for establishing stage hierarchy and understanding stage transition. As this article suggests, we continue to labor within the neo-Piagetian field and to work at the interface of structuralist stage theories and alternative, particularly, socio-cultural, models. Commons’ Model of Hierarchical Complexity offers, in our view, the most promising post-Piagetian prospects for thinking about development in terms of stage. Initial research shows that instruments related to the measurement of hierarchical complexity can help tease out the relationship between moral judgment and religious reasoning, and the question whether the two are meaningfully distinct constructs, or, instead, as we suspect, variants on a common structure of reasoning, itself, and its relative complexity as applied across domains (see Day 2007, in press; Commons, Ost, Lins, Day, Ross, & Crist, 2007).

Conclusion

The psychology of religious development holds an honorable place in psychological science, in and of itself, and as part of a larger interest in religious belief, experience, and practice, and their consequences for other domains of human behavior, on the part of psychologists. Despite almost 40 years of research, the reigning models of religious development appear flawed, and, under close empirical scrutiny, do not bear out as to their central claims regarding the relationship of religious development to moral development. Alternative models have begun to reach the stage of empirical testing, and further research is needed in order for the construct of religious development to be meaningful within psychological science, and for its relationship to other domains of human development to be satisfactorily explored, described, and explained.

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Moral Motivation and Its Developmental Complexity

Ulas Kaplan
Harvard Graduate School of Education
kaplanul@gse.harvard.edu

One of the major challenges in understanding the nature of moral experience is the complexity of real-life moral action and judgment (Durkin, 1995; Nucci, 2002). The motivational process that gives rise to moral judgment and action appears too complex to be accounted for by a single determinant. Research has revealed that moral reasoning is significant yet limited in explaining and predicting moral judgment and action (Durkin, 1995; Nucci, 1999). Hence, Nucci (2002) argued, “it would appear that reasoning about what is morally right needs an additional motivational factor for moral judgment to translate into moral action” (p. 125). In this article, three major sources are considered in terms of their significance in influencing moral action and its relation to moral reasoning: Emotions, social context, and the process of adult development.

According to the cognitive-developmental perspective, the driving force in moral experience is moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969). On the other hand, individuals also act on the basis of their feelings and intuitions (Haidt, 2001; Kagan, 1984; McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, and Larson; 2001). Emotions are universal experiences, built into our nature through evolution, providing guidance for behavior as action tendencies.

Consistently, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) found in their cross-cultural study that for a considerable number of participants “moral judgments were better predicted by
affective reactions than by appraisals of harmfulness” (p. 613). Hence, they concluded that “affective reactions should be added as a source of moral judgment, because they are a part of the decision and judgment apparatus” (Haidt et al. 1993, p. 626). Likewise, Haidt (2001) argued that “moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment” and “moral intuitions (including moral emotions) come first and directly cause moral judgments” (p. 814). Consistently, he emphasized that variation in moral action is more strongly associated with variation in moral emotion than with variation in moral reasoning.

Another major influence in moral action and judgment is social context. From behavioral and social-cognitive learning perspectives, moral actions that are reinforced or modeled in the environment become more likely to occur (Ormrod, 2004). Combining this insight with a developmental social psychology perspective (Durkin, 1995), the extent to which social contexts provide support for the operation of a particular level or type of moral reasoning can be identified as an important variable. To the extent that higher stages of moral reasoning are reinforced and modeled by social contexts, such as schools, family, workplaces, and the media, their operation and translation into moral action would become more likely.

A possible source of variation in moral action and its relation to moral reasoning that has not received much attention in this context is the process of adult development itself. A major reason that moral thought and action have limited consistency is the relatively fragmented nature of our experience until higher and integrative stages of adult development provide increasing unity to human experience. In other words, the process of adult development may be mediating the relationship between moral reasoning and action. To the extent that earlier levels of development are operative, the quality of moral action can be expected to have high intrapersonal variation depending on social contexts and emotional states.

For example, in Robert Kegan’s 2nd order, individual experience is highly subject to personal needs that are differentially supported by different environments. In the 3rd order of consciousness experience is embedded in social relationships, the changes of which have profound influences on thought and action. At higher levels on the other hand, such as the 4th order of consciousness through which the individual identifies with an integrative self-system based on self-authorship, and 5th order based on interconnectedness of multiple identifications (Kegan, 1982; 1994), moral reasoning may become increasingly congruent with moral action through integrative forces of consciousness.

As adult development brings increasing alignment between core dimensions of experience, the action tendencies of emotion and cognition become more attuned to each other, and hence, the consistency between moral reasoning and action increases. This formulation is also in line with the developmental vision of psychosynthesis (Assagioli, 1965/2000; Ferrucci, 1982), according to which the self recognizes, accepts, coordinates, integrates and finally synthesizes multiple identifications and motivations.

In summary, the motivational process that produces moral action and judgment includes the interplay of cognitive, emotional and social factors all subject to dynamic developmental influences. This complex process requires comprehensive and integrative approaches and research designs to be illuminated. Particularly, exploring and identifying patterns of intrapersonal variability across social contexts and multiple developmental stages could enable researchers to understand how cognitive, emotional, social and developmental factors interact in the making of moral motivation. By taking into account multiple sources of variation and their interaction, moral psychologists and educators will be better able to understand and promote moral motivation.

References


Both the Moral Judgment Interview (MJI) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT) were based upon Kohlberg’s (1969) theoretical model and, at least initially, attempted to measure similar constructs utilizing differing formats. One finding, however, has been that the DIT consistently measures higher levels of moral reasoning than does the MJI. To explain this finding, Narvaez and Bock (2002) state, “The DIT does not measure the more competent end of the ‘zone of proximal development’ in which verbal articulation of one’s perspective is required. The DIT tests the other, less competent, end of the ‘zone’, that which is apparent when assistance (such as words on a page) is available” (p. 298).

The process of calling upon Vygotsky’s socio-historical theory to explain and support the construct of an instrument arising from Piagetian, constructivist theory is problematic. The primary initial issue, however, in evaluating the Narvaez and Bock (2002) argument is to determine its degree of faithfulness to, and the adequacy of its representation of Vygotskian theory.

**Vygotsky and the Zone**

Vygotsky (1978) proposed that there are two distinct levels of cognitive development. The first level he termed *actual development* and defined it as “the level of development of a child’s mental function determined by independent problem solving” (p. 86). The second level he termed *potential development* and defined it as “that which a child can achieve if given the benefit of support during the task. It is the ability to solve problems under the guidance of, or in collaboration with, more capable peers” (p. 86). Vygotsky suggested that there is a gap between these two levels of development and that this gap represents cognitive functions that are in the process of maturing. Vygotsky referred to this developmental gap as the zone of proximal development (ZPD), the zone where “good learning” (p. 89) would occur because it was learning in advance of development.

Thus, according to Vygotsky (1978), information that is independently known is not within the ZPD. Yet, Narvaez and Bock (2002) claim that the MJI measures the more competent end, or higher end, of the ZPD. The MJI extended response / interview format does include probing questions to better identify the reasoning exhibited, but such probing was specifically designed not to lead the individual to higher levels of moral reasoning. MJI responses are products of independent problem solving and, therefore, cannot be considered as being connected at all with the ZPD.

The other related claim made by Narvaez and Bock (2002) that the DIT, with its multiple-choice format, measures the less competent end, or lower end, of the ZPD is not without issues. “The DIT tests the other, less competent, end of the ‘zone’, that which is apparent when assistance (such as words on a page) is available” (p. 298). This thought confirms that Narvaez and Bock believe that the DIT itself is actually scaffolding the moral reasoning of the individuals it is attempting to measure. Narvaez and Bock should be given credit for acknowledging a fact rarely discussed, that every assessment instrument, to some degree, is also an intervention. For Vygotsky (1978), learning that can occur with the assistance of others, that is, within a highly social learning context marks the upper boundary of the ZPD. Without question the DIT, or most assessment instruments, is not a highly social learning context and therefore incapable of mediating the socially determined function of scaffolding. If the DIT qualifies as scaffolding so might a cheat sheet taken into an exam. It is, in fact, difficult to understand the notions of more and less competent ends of the ZPD when the zone consists only of immature cognitive functions. It is almost as if Narvaez and Bock wish to impose stage theory, or at least hierarchical segmentation, within the ZPD, an issue not discussed by Vygotsky.

Palincsar (1998) argues, “it is the atheoretical use of scaffolding that has become problematic” (p. 370). Palincsar continues by claiming the ZPD and scaffolding as “the most used and least understood constructs to appear in contemporary educational literature” (p. 370). The inclusion of Vygotskian theory as an explanatory model for elevated DIT scoring is confusing, a misappropriation of Vygotsky’s reasoning, and another substantiation of Palincsar’s contention.

The argument of Narvaez and Bock (2002) becomes more problematic for its inattention to a far simpler resolution. Of significant applicability to this issue was the work by Caygill and Eley (2001) where parallel versions of 27 tasks were used to measure the effect of four task formats on student achievement. Caygill and Eley concluded “multiple-choice questions produced higher success rates than the other formats when the answer was very complex” (p. 6). Students seemed to be able to use partial knowledge in order to recognize a correct multiple-choice option. This study concluded “the multiple-choice format is suitable for questions where the process used to find the answer is not being tested or where no process is involved, for example where questions have unambiguous, factual answers” (p. 13).

Caygill and Eley (2001) found the interview format more suitable for complex knowledge recall questions, tasks requiring experimentation or investigation, and tasks requiring the use of higher-order thinking skills such as comparing, contrasting, explaining, or justifying” (p. 12). The study concluded that the interview format is most suitable when both process as well as product needs to be assessed.

It seems logical that the DIT may well overestimate actual levels of moral reasoning because of the multiple-choice format and that, to some degree, the MJI
underestimates moral reasoning because of its reliance on the verbal expression of reasoning. To make a case that a multiple-choice assessment instrument (the DIT) is a more accurate measurement of something as complex as moral reasoning runs contrary to most thinking in the field of measurement and assessment. Though complex in its underlying process, the simplest and most accurate explanation of the scoring differences between the MJI and the DIT may simply be the commonly accepted notion that recognition tasks are easier than production tasks.

In the final analysis, it may not be meaningful at all that the DIT consistently records higher levels of moral reasoning than does the MJI. The difference in scoring levels between the two instruments is meaningful only if it impacts the purpose for which the instrument was administered. If the purpose for administration is simply for ranking purposes, the scoring differences between the instruments is nearly meaningless. If the purpose for administration is to determine the effect of a particular intervention (a course in ethics for example), scoring differences between different instruments may be unimportant. It is interesting that, after decades of using the instrument, lively discussions remain possible over what the DIT is actually measuring. It is also highly appropriate.

References